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INTRODUCTION

The subject of servitudes, considering both
its legal and equitable nature, occupies a definitely
interesting and peculiar position in the vast field of
law.

It is far more comprehensive than would. appear

at first glance.

The subjects to which it has

reference, and the objects of its action and influence
are varied and many; yet, the different phases of legal
history, through which flservitudes fl has passed, have
treated it with kindness and burdened it with only
necessary changes in accordance with the advance of
civilization and its concurrent needs.
There has been no vast breach of connection
with the legal past - no sudden and explosive period
of theorizing and reconstruction.

The principles upon

which the law of servitudes was founded in the early
periods embracing Roman Law and English Common Law, have
remained practically intact.

The construction of the

legal foundation was perhaps th e strongest and most

1.
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durable of the many legal divisions that we have

today~

With the exception of widening the scope and relaxing certain
conditions inconsistent with the modern circumstances,
the formulators ofthe law of "servitudes" accomplished
their work with an unusual degree of finesse, and moulded
it into a permanent structure of the law.

The far-seeing

characteristics associated with these formulators form the
basis of an undying appreciation on the part of the legal
profession of today!
The purpose of this treatise is to trace the
development, generally, of the law of "servitudes" from
its early consideration through the different legal systems,
up to the present period of legal history.
As previously mentioned, the changes are neither
great nor many; but a consideration of the application of
these first, and lasting, principles will prove most
interesting.

This is the method to be fOllowed here.

Statutory development as evidenced in the code state
of California will be discussed.

At the outset, it will

be of interest to note that the codification of these

2.
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general principles, with a modification of the
scope of application, constitutes the California law
on the subject of "servitudes".

No drastic changes

have been offered in this codification - evidence,
again, of the foresight of the formulators of this
portion of the law.

-

JTO 'K. 
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Part I.
LEGAL

SERVITUDES

An easement is defined as a "ppivilege, liberty,
or advantage without profit, which the owner of one parcel
of land may have in the lands of another - or, it is a
service which one estate owes to another, or a right or
privilege in one man's estate for the advantage or
l.

conv eni ence of the owner of another estate!!.
The essential qualities of easements as enumerated
by all the authorities are:- First,they ar e inc or por eal;
second, they are imposed upon corporeal property, and not
upon the owner of it; third, they confer no right to a
participation in the profits arising from such property;
fourth, they are imposed for the benefit of corporeal
property; and fifth, there must be two distinct
tenements, the dominant to which the right belongs, and
the servient on which the obligation is imposed.
A servitude, at civil law, is defined to be a right
whereby one thing is subject to another thing or person,
for use or convenience contrary to a common right.
"Servirzes It may be divided into real and personal.

1. 19 Corpus Juris 862.

I.

-

Real

are such as one estate owes unto another estate, as,
because HI am the owner of such a ground, I have the right
of way through the ground of another person, or, because
I am possessed of this house, my neighbor cannot beat out
a light or window out of his house towards mine, or
build his house higher without my leave." T
It

~s

the nature of servitudes not to constrain

anyone to do, but to suffer something.

IIHence it may

be perceived that he whose tenement may be subject to a
servitude is not, in the common case, bound to perform any
act for the benefit of the persons or tenement to which
it is due.

His whole burden consists either in being

restrained from doing, or in being obliged to suffer
something to be done upon his property by another.

In

the first case, in which the proprietor is barely restrain
ed from acting, the servitude is called negative, in the
last positive." 2
Both terms easements and servitudes are used by
the common law writers, and often indiscriminately.

The

former, however, is more generally applied to the right
enjoyed, the latter to the burden imposed.

The right of

1. Erskine Institutes 352.

2. Erskine Institutes 352
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way, which one man has, as the

o~vner

of an estate, over

the land of another, is an easement in the one estate
and a servitude upon the other.
!lIn the Civil Law, a servitude, which is but a
single right of propeJ:>ty, and is called in our law an
easement, is a bUI'den affecting lands, by '{vhieh the
propJ:>ietor is restrained from the full use of his
property, or is obliged to suffer another to do certain
acts upon it, which, were it not for the burden, would
be competent solely to the owner".

1

An easement is a right in one person created by
grant or its equivalent, to do certain acts on another's
land or to compel such other to refrain from doing certain
acts thereon, the right generally existing as an accessory
to the ownership of neighboring land, and for its
benefit.
liThe easements of most importance are:- Rights
in extension or diminution of natural rights in regard
to air, water and support; rights of way over another's
land; rights to maintain aqueducts or drains on another's
land; rights to have light and air pass to one's windows

1

Laumier v. Francis 23 Mo. 181
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without obstruction; pew rights in churches and burial
. ht
rlg
. s in

..

ceme~erles.

I,

1

In primary consideration of the subject of
easements, it is essential that the differences between
easements and profits a prendre be pointed out.

It is

notable that all the definitions and descriptions of
('easement" omit profits or interests in the land
burdened.

This exclusion or omission, which is

absolutely correct and we ll-founded, is justified in the
follovling manner: This right of profit a prendre if
enjoyed by reason of holding a certain other estate, is
regarded in the light of an easement appurtenant to such
estate; whereas, if it belongs to an individual, distinct
from any ownership of other lands, it takes the character
of an interest in the land itself, rather than that of a
proper easement in or out of the same.
As recognized by the respectable weight of
authori ty - "rights of accomrnodatlon in another's land,
as distinguished from those which are directly profitable,
are properly called easements ir .

2

This distinctj.on was substantially pointed out
in the early New York case of Pierce v. Keaton, decided
in 1877.

1.

2.

In that case plaintiff's intestate, owning a

Modern Law of Real Property. Tiffany, p. 677
Burton on Real Property #1165
-4
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farm, granted a strip of it to the N.Y. & O. M. RH.
Company, reserving to himself the privilege of mowing
and cultivating the surplus ground of the strip not
required for railroad pur poses.

The deed contained this

reservation - It Said parties of the first part also to
have the privilege of mowing and cultivating the surplus
ground of said strip of land not required for railroad
purposes".

At the time of the conveyance there was a

mortgage on the farm, which was subsequently foreclosed.
The deed given upon the foreclosure sale excepted the strip
of land so c onveyed, stating that it "is reserved as con
veyed to said

!I

O. & M. RR. Co. defendants who succeeded

to the title of the purchaser, entered upon the railroad
land and cut and removed wheat growing thereon.

In an

action of trespass it was held that the reservation in
the deed to the railroad company was not an easement
appurtenant to the remaining portion of the farm, but a
right to profits in the land conveyed reserved to the
grantors Eersonally, , not as owners of or for the
benefit of the farm; that such right therefore did not
pass by the deed on foreclosure sale; and that defendants

-5
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were liable.

1

Quoting

f :c~om

this same cas e, which provides an

excellent discussion exemplifying the distinction between
an easement and profits a prendre: "The term 'easement'
has sometimes been applied to rights in or over land without
strict regard to the recognized distinctions between the
different kind or class of rights. These distinctions
may be impaired and even obliterated by the circumstances
attending, and the manner of their creation.

An easement

is a liberty, privilege or advantage in land without profit,
existing distinct from the ownership of the soil.
liThe right to profits, denominated profit a prendre,
consists of a right to take a part of the soil or produce
of the land, in which there is a supposable value.

It is

in its nature corporeal, and is capable of livery, which
easements are not, and may exist independently

without

connection with or being appendant to other property."

"As

the terms of the reservation indicate, a personal

privilege and as there is nothing in the nature of the
right reserved connecting it in any manner with the ownership
or use of the remainder of the farm, there seems no alternati ve
but to apply the established rules and recognized legal

Pierce v. Keaton 70 N.Y. 419

1
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distinctions to the transaction - for a profit a
prendre in the land of another, when not granted in
favor of some dominant tenement, carLYlot be said to be
an easement, but an interest or estate in the land
itself.

fl

1

Another important distinction which is
necessary to the proper ap plication of the doctrines
concerning easements, is found in the differences
between an easement and a license.

An easement always

implies an interest in the land in or over which it
is enjoyed.

A license carries no such interest.

The

interest of an easement may be a freehold or a chattel
one, according to its duration: whereas, whatever
right one has in another's land by license

may~

as a

general proposition, be said to be revocable at will
by the owner of the land in which it is to be enjoyed.
An easement must be an interest in or over the
soil.

It lies not in livery, but in grant, and a

freehold interest in it cannot be created or passed
otherwise than by deed.
This distinction between a license and an ease
ment may be illustrated by the effect given to a con

1.

N. Y. 419 (421 et

se~. · )

.
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veyance of the land or over which it is to be enjoyed.
A conveyance of land by the grantor, who has given a parol
license to another to enjoy a right in the nature of an
easement in it, ipso facto, determines the license;
whereas whosoever takes an estate upon which a servitude
has been imposed, holds it subject to the same servitude,
and in the same manner as it was held by his grantor.
To illustrate:-

If the grant be a personal

license of pleasure, it extends only to the individual
and is not to be exercised by or with servants - but if it
be a license for profit, and not for pleasure, it may.
(The case subject to this reference was of a license to
hunt, and as it included the right to kill and take with
him the deer at his pleasure, it was held a license to
go on with his servants, or send them to hunt; whereas,
if it were a mere license to hunt at his pleasure, he
cannot take away the game, nor go with servants, nor
assign his license to another.)

1

In classifying servitudes, the civil law recog
nized a much more minute subdivision of the various forms
they assumed than those in use in the common law,

1

Duchess of Norfolk v. Wiseman-? Meeson & Welbsy (Eng)?7
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although the latter has borrowed liberally from the
former.
That class of servitudes, which we treat of here,
waE called Predial, lands and tenements, being such
services as one estate owes to another.

These were again

divided into rural and urban, the one relating- to land
not occupied by buildings, the other affecting bUildings,
whether in a city proper, a villa or in the country.
Among the rural services was the right of passing over
the land of another, which took various names of Iter,
Actus, and Via, according to the extent and mode of using
the same; the right of bringing water through another's
land, called Aquae ductus, when done by pipe or rivulet;
Fishing, drawing water, hunting, watering cattle, etc.;
all these were what were called Affirmative Services.
The urban services were either affirmative or
negative. Among the affirmative urban services were the
right to rest the wall of a house for its support a.gainst
that of another, and to require the owner of the latter
to keep the same in repair; the right to extend a balcony
over the land of another; a right to have a sink or

-9
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gutter. through a neighbor's house, to construct what
lights or windows he chooses against the estate of another;
to have a clear and pleasant prospect from one's house
over another's court or yard, etc.
Among the negative services of an urban character
were that one's neighbor should not turn the droppings
of the eaves of his house upon the house or ground of
him who has the servitude; that he should not darken
his windows; or hinder his prospect by building or by
planting trees, etc.
The description and enumeration of the
servitudes known to the French law were made known by
means of certain articles in the Code Napoleon.

These

included - First, such as arise from the situation of
places, as the rights of the owners of adjacent lands
in respect to the waters upon the one passing on or
across the other, the boundaries of adjacent lands, and
the like. Second, such .as are created by law, that is,
party walls and ditches between two estates, and party
or division hedges dividing lands, servitudes of view
over a neighbor's property, and those of eaves of roofs

-IQ

~----~-------------------------------------------------------------~~

and of ways answering to ways of necessity at common law.
Third, servitudes created by the act of man, which are
divided into urban and rural, answering to a like division
in the civil law, servitudes continual and continuable,
and the servitudes apparent and non-apparent.
As a transition, it may properly be said that the
classification (or a great many of the classifications)
of easements in the Code of France are recognized by the
courts of the common law, as for instance, that of

COl1

tinuous and discontinuous which are thus defined:
"Continuous are those of which the enjoyment is or may be
continual, without the necessity of any actual interference
by man, as a waterspout or a right of light or air.

Dis

continuous are those the enjoyment of which can be had
only by the interference of man, as ±:lights of way, or a
right to draw water."

1

Likewise, in the classification as to affirmative
and negative easements, we find that in affirmative
easements the servient tenement nmst permit some act to be
done thereon by the owner of the dominant estate, such as
passing over it as a way, discharging water upon it from

1

Lampman v. Milks

21 N.Y. 505
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a channel or spout or eaves of his house.
In negative easements, the owner of the servient
estate is prohibited from doing something on his own land
which he otherwise might do, such as not building upon
the same, whereby so doing he obstructs the light and air
from reaching the dominant estate, or not digging in his
soil so as to weaken the foundation of the house standing
on the dominant estate.
A leading case on this subject of negative easements
is found in Pitkin v. Long Island RR. Company.

The RR.

Company entered into an agreement, or at least an
obligation, to stop their trains at a particular place
adjoining his property.

In substance, the court held it

to be an easement or servitude, binding upon the property
of the company, and an interest in their land in favor of
the landowner.

1

The landowner in such case had a negative easement
in the property of the RH. Company, whel"eby he might
restrict them, as owners of a servient tenement, in the
exercise of general and natural rights of property, so
as to compel them to use it in a particular way, by

1

kee~ing

Pitkin v. Long Island RR. Co. 2 Barb. Ch. 221, 231.
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certain erections thereon, and stopping their trains at
a particular place for his use and benefit as the owner
of the adj acent land, Yvhich thus became the dominant
tenement.
Following along the same lines, there is another
interesting decision .rendered by the Supreme Court of
Vermont in 1870.

I have reference to the Claremont Bridge

Company v. Royce.

In this case a bridge corporation owned

a toll-bridge across a river, and to prevent persons
avoiding the payment of tolls, in crossing the river, the
corporation purchased of a land-owner adjoining their
bridge and the river, a ri ght to use it as a way to the
river.

On these facts the court held, that the right

claimed was a proper subject of grant, and under it the
corporation could stop persons traveling

ac~oss

this land,

and maintain an action against anyone who knowingly crossed
t i':.is land.

1

An easement or servitude is a definite right, and
an injury to it, like the violation of any right, must
be compensated.

The protection of the law is every bit

as prominent in this class of cases, as well as in other

I

Claremont Bridge Company v. Royce

42 Vermont 730.
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divisions of legal rights.

Hence, if the owner of the

servient estate does anything to obstruct, interfere with,
or impair the enjoyment of an easement therein, the
owner of the dominant estate may maintain an acti on
therefor, even though he may not be able to prove any
injury and actual loss to have been occasioned thereby;
because a repetition of such acts might ripen into an
adverse right.
As to what will constitute an adverse enjoyn:ent
sufficient to give one party e.n easement in another's
l8nd, the authority all tends to the proposition, that 
it TIUlst be had ...,lhi1e there is someone to whom such use
is

adver~e.

It must be open, such as the owner is pre

smned to be cogni.7.ant of.
not give a right.

If steal tbj.:l~T done, it would

But it is no objection that the user

began in trespass.
However, eVen though no actual damage can be
shown by the obstruction or interference in the easement
by the owner of the dominant estate, the law in such
cases will presume a damage, in order to enable the party
to vindicate his right.

Or the owner of the dominant

estate may enter upon the servient e s tate and remove any
obstructlon wrongfully placed there to the detriment
of his easement in t he same.

If these are cl?eated by

the owner of the servient tenement, the one entitled to
such easement may make such entry without any previous
request to have them removed.

But if erected by a

stranger, or by the grantor of the owner of the servient
estate, it seems that there should be

8

prior request.

So, if the effect of an act done on the servient estate
will be to create a nuisance, the owner of the dominant
estate ne ed not wait till some actual injury has been
suffered.

And he may, ·where his tl tIe is clear, have an

injunction to restrain a nuisance to the enjoyme nt of
his easement.
In t h is latter case of nuis ances, and their
injunction, the usual rules pertaining to the issuing
of injunctions apply with equal force.

As, for example,

in the case of McMaugh v. Burke it was held that if the
t hreatened damage is likely to be sli ght, the court will
not enjoin, but leave the owner of the easement to proceed
at law.

1

1

McMaugh v. Burke

12 R. I. 499.
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An

ea~ement,

irrespective of the manner in which

it has been acquired, can be extinguished only in some manner
or mode recognized by law.
There are several generally recognized modes of
termination of easements - kno wn and upheld universally
throughout the United states, in jurisdictions embracing
both the common law, and statute, and in almost the same
form

r~cognized

in the earlier systems of the law with

which we are concerning ourselves in this thesis.
First, Abandorunent.

A party entitled to a right

of way, or other mere easement in the land of another may
abandon and extinguish such right by acts in paiS, and
without deed or other instrument in writing.

This he may

do without responsibility of any sort, and without con
sulting the grantor where the easement was created by
grant.

Ordinarily, the questlon of abandonment is purely

one of intention.

This was capably exemplified in the

case of Snell v. Levitt in the following words:

"Nothing

short of an intention to abandon the right to an easement
will operate to that effect, when other persons have not
been led by acts to treat the servient estate as free of

-16

the servitude and where the easement can be resumed
without doing an injury to their rights in respect to
it. fl

1

flAn easement acquired by grant cannot be lost by non
user alone, but must be accompanied with an intention;
2
expressed or implied, of abandonment."
The acts relied on as evidencing this intent' to abandon
must be of an unequivocal and decisive character.

Whether

a party has abandoned his right to an easement is a question
of fact for the determination of the jury, and is never a
question of law for the court to determine.
Notwithstanding the small minority of decisions to the
contrary, it has been universally held, except where other
wise provided by statute or by the deed itself, that mere
nonuser of an easement created by a deed for a period however
long will not amount to an abandonment.
liTo extinguish an easement acquired by grant the non
user must be accompanied with an expressed or implied
intentlon of abandonment and the owner of the servient
estate, acting upon the intention of abandonment and the
actual nonuser, must have incurred expenses on his ovvn

1
2

Snell v. Levitt - 110 N. Y. 595.
People v. Southern Pacific Company, 172 Cal. 692.
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estate.

The three elements, nonuser, intention to

abandon, and damage to the owner of the servient estate
must concur in order to extinguish the easement.1t 1
"The rule that a grantee will not be permitted to
resume an easement granted, 1vhere his acts have led other
persons to treat the servient estate as free from the
servitude, does not apply where no one has been mislead
to his prejudice by the acts of such grantee."

2

"While a right of way may be lost by abandon.ment, non
user is only one of the elements of proof from which such
abandonment can be inferred.

The real question to be

determined is the intention of the owner of the right."

3

An interesting discussion of the intention to abandon
is found in the California case of Cohn v. San Pedro, etc;
there, the railroad company sought to buy the land it was
using under eminent domain, and aQmitted to the plaintiff,
that he was the owner of the land.

Plaintiff having refused

to sell, the railro&td continued to use it under the eminent
domain proceedings; plaintiff claiming that this evidenced
an intention to abandon.

The court held: TlTbe fact that,

after defendant railroad company moved its tracks and yard

I
2
3

Smith v. Worn, 93 Cal. 206.
Ibid.
Ocean Shore RR. Company 'g. Spring Valley V\iater Company,
87 Cal. App. 188.
-18
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from the immediate vicinity of the land in question, the
general manager of defendant r a ilroad company called u p on
plaintiff and admitted plain tif f was the owner of the lot,
and offered to purchase the property from the plaintiff, did
not evidence an intention to abandon on the part of the
defendant, where plaintiff refused to sell and as a result
thereof the defendant continued using the property for the
purp ose for wh ich it was dedicated under
proceedings.

t~e

eminent domain

1.
rT

In gen eral, it may be said t h at the cases are at a
distinct variance on t he question of nonuser as an abandon
ment - that is, nonuser standing practically alone.
(California decis i ons point to the conclusion that the law
is settled in

tb~s

particular field in this state.)

The

general authority, however, le a ns to the p rinciple t h at,
mere nonuser, unless for the prescriptive period, wi.ll :Daise
no presumption of abandoIilment - this, of course, is in the
absence of special statutory regu lation on the nonuser
question.
Second, Noncompliance with conditions.

A failure to

comply substantially with the condit i ons (imposed u p on the

1

Cohn v. San Pedro, 1. A. &

s.

L. Co. 103 Cal. App. 496.
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grantee as the consideration for the easement) may operate
to work a forfeiture of the easement, unless, as is per
missible, there is a waiver of performance of the con
ditions.

Where an easement has been forfeited by con-compliance

vvith the condition imposed by the instrl.:unent creating it
and by notice of the election to forfeit it, the easement
is not restored by a subsequent compliance with the con
dition without the consent and against the protest of the
owner of the servient tenement.
Third, Merger by unity of title.

An owner of land

cannot have an easement in his own estate in fee, for the
obvious reason that in having the full and unlimited right
and power to make any and every possible use of the land,
all subordinate and inferior derivative rights are
necessarily merged and lost in the higher right.
TlA servitude camlOt be held by the owner of the
servient tenement; and the vesting of the right to the
servitude and the right to the servient tenement in the same
person extinguishes the servitude by merger of the estates.lI
In reference to what quantum of title-unity is
necessary before there is extinguishJnent by merger of

1

Drake v. Russian River Land Company, 10 Cal. App. 654.
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estates, the California Supreme Court has settled on the
follo wing characteristics, whi ch appear to reflect the
general consensus of American au thority in this respect:

"I n order that unity of ti tle to two estates should extin
guish an existing easement, the ownership of the two estates
should be coextensive, equal in validity, quality and all
other characteristics." 1
Fourth, Act of God or Operation of Law.

Where an

easement is granted to a particular person t o be enjoyed
during the continuance of eertain conditions, it is
extinguished whenever these conditions cease to exist.
Fifth,

Severance and Partition.

An easement is not

extinguished by a division of the estate to which it is
appurtenant, but the ovmer or assignee of any portion of
that estate may claim the right so far as it is applicable
to his part of the property, provided the right can be
enjoyed as to the separate parcels without any additional
burden upon the servient estate.
Sixth,

Release, Agreement or License.

The owner of

an easement may release the right to the owner of the
servient estate by deed.

1

Like"wise, an easement acquired

Cheda v. Bodkin, 173 Cal. 7.

-21

by adverse use will not be defeated by obtaining a license
for its further enjoyment, although the application for
such a license is evidence
adverse but permissive.

that

the former use was no

A parol agreement between the owners

of the dominant and servient estates may operate to ex
tinguish an easement wheth e r created by grant or prescription,
where such agreement has been e x ecuted by the owner of the
servient estate.
Seventh,

Alterations and obstructio n s inconsistent

with the easement.

While an obstruction by a mere trespasser

will not operate to extinguish an easement, yet if the owner
of the easement by hisown act renders t h e use of the easement
impossible, or himself obstructs it in a mann er inconsistent
with its further enjoyment, or p e r mits the owner of the
servient estate to do so, the e aseme n t will be consid e red
as ab andoned.

But to cons ti tutesuch an aban donment the

acts relied on raust be of a decisive a nd conclusive c h aracter.

-22

Eighth,

Change of location of way. The right of an

individual to a passway when properly acquired by prescriptive
use i:s not lost by slight changes which make little
difference in the passway or its use, but it is otherwise
where a new passway, without closing the old and long-used
one, is opened leading from it, having new termini

and a

wholly different course.
Touching on t h is point, the case of Ricioli v. Lynch,
a decision of the Supreme Court of California, stated: "A
tenant of plaintiff and a tenant of defendants, with the
permission and consent of defendants, having changed the
course of the road for a distance of about t wo hundred yards
to avoid a steep hill, such change did not 8.ffect plaintiff's
right to use the road, including the new section."
Ninth,

Cessation of purpose or neces s ity.

1

A way of

necessity ceases as soon as the necessity to use it ceases.
Likev7ise, if an easement is granted for a particular purpose
t b e right terminates as soon as the purpose for which it was
granted ceases to exist.
!fA right of way from necessity only continues while
the necessity exists. !! 2

- ---- - ---.- - -
1
2

Ricioli v. Lynch, 65 Cal. App. 63.
Kripp v. Curtis, 71 Cal. 62.
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"The necessity ceases when another way has been
acquired, or when, by the acquisition of othe r lands, the
owner can reach the public road without traversing the land
of others.1I
irA way of necessity can not be extinguished so long as
the necessity exists, and must be presumed to continue,
unless some fact found by the court shows that the right no
longer exists; and a finding that a road used across plaintiff's
land by special agreement, without stating what the agreement
was, is not inconsistent with t h e continuance of the way of
necessity. 1t 1
Tenth, Removal or destruction of servient tenement.
Removal or destruction of the servient tenement may extin
guish the easement.

Howeve r , an easement may survive a

partial destruction of the servient tenement, if t h ere is
anything remaining u p on which t h e dominant tenement can
operate.
That California is definitely in accord with this general
principle, will be evid e nced by the

fmllOi~Jing:

"A right i n

the nature of an easement, as it is sometimes called, is
extinguished by the destruction of the building, or the part

1

Blum v. Weston, 102 Cal. 367.

-...-.'.
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thereof upon which the eaSeT'l ent is imposed, so that there
is nothing upon which it can operate." ••••

"A grant of

the right to use the stairway of a building gives no interest
in the soil which will survive the destruction of the
building, and the right ceases whenever the building is
destroyed without the fault of the owner of the servient
tenement, and the owner of the right to use the stairway
will not acquire any right in any new building which may be
1
erected in the place of the one destroyed."
Eleventh,

Forfeiture for misuser.

The right to an

easement is not lost by using it in an unauthorized manner,
or to an unaut h orized extent, unless it is impossible to
sever the increased burden so as to preserve .to the owner of
the dominant tenement that to '.'ihich he is entitled, and to
i mpose upon the servient tenement only that burden which was
originally imposed upon it without the oblig ation attempted
to be imposed u p on it by alterations.

The rule is especially

applicable where the servitude is not materially increased.
~velfth,

Recovery

of_~amage

for invasion of easement.

The recovery of damages for the invasion of an easement does
not operate either before or after satisfaction of the

1

Muzio v. Erickson, 41 Cal. App. 413.
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judgment as an extinguismaent of the easement.

It is merely

an indemnity for a past wrong leaving unaffected the right
to the easement.
Thirteenth,

Adverse possession.

The right to an

easement may be lost by an occupation on the part of the
servient owner adverse to, and inconsistent with, the non
user by the owner of the

ease ~ent,

if such occupation

extends over the statutory period, and is continuous; but
the right will not be lost wh e re t he occupation is not
clearly adverse, nor where it is not continued for the period
pr~scribed

by statute.

"While the mere nonuser of an easemen t acquired by
grant for any period of time will not if its elf operate to
ext ttnguish it, yet when such nonuser is ' coupled with an
actual and physical interference with its exercise and with
an adverse possession of the servient tenement for the period
pr e scribed by law, the easement will be extinguished by the
statute of limitatio~
Fourteenth,

If

1

Dedication or appropriation to public use.

The right to an easement will be extinguished by a lawful
appropriation to a public use of the land which will render

1

City and County of San Francisco v. Main-23 Cal. App . 86.
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the enjoyment of the easement impossible.
Fifteenth,

Est?J?.J2.~h

The right to an easement may be

lost by estoppel.
Sixteenth,

Revival of lost right.

Where an easement

is once extinguished the right is forever gone and cannot
be revived, and the use can be reestablished only by the
acquisi tion of a nei;"iT title; but if the right is merely
suspended it may be revived.
trWhen the owner of an easement licenses another to do
an act which affects the enjoyment of the easement, when the
license is revoked, the right to the easement revives with
full vigor. 1t 1
This concludes the general discussion as to the methods
recognized in the majority of jurisdiction of extinguishing
easements.

It will be noticed that California recognizes,

by statute and accompanying decision, only four or fj.ve of
the sixteen methods set forth.
are of

a general

But these recognized methods

nature and embrace many of the others

specifically pointed out.
The California statutes have expiliicitly and definitely
set out all the matter embraced in the general subject of

1

Keller v. City of Oak land, 54 Cal. App . 169
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"servitudes. II

By reason of Se ctlon 801 of the Civil Code,

there is no doubt left as to what are servitudes or ease
ments in this jurisdiction:
"The follo wing land burdens, or servitudes upon land,
may be attached to other land as incidents or appurtenances,
and are then called easements:
1.
2.
3.

4.
5.
6.
7.
8.

9.
10.
11.
12.
13.

14.
15.
16.

17.

The right of pasture;
The right of fishing;
The ri ght of taking game;
The right of way;
The right of taking water, minerals and other things;
The ri ght of transacting business on land;
The right of conducting la"w ful sports upon land;
The rigbt of receiving air, light or heat from or over, or
discharging the sru,1e upon or over la~d;
The right of receiving water from or discharging the same
upon land;
The right of flooding land;
The ri ght of having water flow without diminution or
disturbance of any kind;
The right of using a wall as a party-wall;
The right of receiving more than natural support from
adjacent land or things affixed thereon;
The right of having the whole of a division fence main
tained by a coterminous owner;
The right of having public conveyance stopped, or of
stopping the same on land;
The right of a se a t in church;
The right of burial." 1

"The follo wing land burdens, or servitudes upon land,
may be granted and held, though not attac h ed to land:
One.
The ri ght to pasture and of fishing and taking game.
Two.
The right of a seat in church.
T~ee. The right of burial.
Four. The right of taking rents and tolls.
Five , The right of way_
Six.
The right of taking water, wood, minerals or other things." 2.
1
2

Cal. Civil Code, 801.
Ibid 802.
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In view of these two sections, California is seen to
have divided easements, or servitud e s, (the terms being used
interchangeably), into t wo main classes - servitudes attach ed
to land, and servitudes not attached to land.

This con

stitutes California's statutory embodyment of the common law
division of "easements a ppurtenant and in gross."
Anoth er change wrought by codification of easement law
in this state is found in the fact that there is a distinct
difference'between easements and profits a prendre at common
law, while under our code the differ e nce is not at all pro
nounced •.•• it is considered as very similar, even to the extent
that the code includes at least one common law class of profit
a prendre (right of taking minerals) in its classification
of easements.
The code likewise provides the follo wing succinct state
ment of law, which will be wholly sufficient in itself without
any further elaboration:
"A servitude can be created only by one who has a vested
estate in the servient tenement." 1
"The extent of a servitude is determined by the terms of
the grant~ or the nature of the enjoyraent by which it was
qcquired.' 2

1
2

Cal. Civil Code 804.
Ibid 806.
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"In case of partition of the dominant tenement the
burden must be apportioned according to the division of the
dominant tenement, but not in such a way as to increase the
burden up on the servient tenement." 1
rtThe O1.'ffier of a future estate in a dominant tenement
may use easements attached thereto for the purpose of
viewing waste, demanding rent, or removing an obstruction
to the enjoyment of such easements, although such tenement
is occupied by a tenant." 2
.
"The owner of any estate in a dominant tenement, or
the occupant of such tenement, may maintain an action for
the enforcement of an easement attached thereto." 3
TIThe owner in fee of a servient tenement may maintain
an action for the possession of the land, against anyone
unlawfully possessed tbereof, though a servitude exists
thereon in favor of the public. It 4

"A servitude is extinguished:
By the vesting of the right to the servitude and right
to the servient tenement in the same person;
2. By the destruction of the servienL tenement;
3. By the performance of any act upon either tenement, by
the owner of the servitude, or-wIth his assent, which is
incompatible with its nature or exercise; or,
4. \n1.en the servitude was acquired by enjoyment, by disuse
t hereof by the owner of the servitude for the period pre
scribed for acquiring title by enjoyment.1t 5.
1.

The portion to be noted in conn.ec t ion with the ext in
guishment of an easement, under subdivision four of the
last section referred to, is that "this method of extin
guishment does not apply to easements founded upon a grant.
1

2

Ibid 807
Ibid 808

3

4
5

Ibid 809
Ibid 810

Ibid 811
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The latter cannot be lost by mere nonuser for any length
of time, no matter how great." 1
The distinctions drawn between easements and licenses,
and profits a prendre, of necessity d emand more than a mere
mention of covenants running with the land.

The latter

division is allied with easements in nature and mode of
transfer and respecting assignment and will be considered
at this point of development, only with respect to that
aRliance.
Covenants in general are divided into express and
imu lied.

Express covenants are further divided into

2.
personal covenants, and thos ,e that run wi th the land.
Covenants 17lhich may be enforced by the assignee of
the term or of the reversion are said to run with the land.
If a covenant touches or concerns the thing demised and there
is privity of estate between the parties, it runs with
the land.
In this respect, Morse v. Aldrich, decided in 1837,
is expressive of the weight of authority.

tlOne C. conveyed

to the plaintiff's grantor, in fee, a parcel of land,
including a p ortion of C's mill pond, with liberty of ingress

1
2

9 Cal. Juris. -961.
Real Property, Hopkins. (Hornbook series) p. 134;
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and egress to and from any part of the described land and
water to dig out and carry a'Nay the whole or any part of
the soil.

After the same granted premises had been con

veyed to the plaintiff an agreement was between C., and the
plaintiff, in which C. covenanted (without mentioning
his heirs or assigns), that he would, upon the plaintiff's
request, draw off his pond six days a year, in August and
September, for the purpose of giving the plaintiff an
oP:9ortn nity of digging and carrying out mud.

C. died and

his estate in the mill pond descended to defendants.

In

an action by the plaintiff against the defendants, on
this covenant, it was held that there was a privity of
estate between the parties and that the covenant ran with
the land."
"This is a covenant real and runs with the land.
Two things are requisite to such a covenant; first, it
must have for its object something concerning the realty;
and secondly, there must be a privity of estate as
between the covenantor and covenantee.

1I

1

The covenants of title re g arded as real or running
with the land, are those against incumbrances of general

1

Morse v. Aldrich - 19 Pickering ( Mass)

449, 451.
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warranty, and for quiet enjoyment.

As covenants running

with the land affect some interest in or concerned with the
title to real estate, it is clear that such covenants may
be of almost infinite variety.
Among covenants running with land are all implied
covenants; all covenants for quiet

enjo~~nent;

covenants

in general relating to leases; fences; party-walls;
rights of way; streets; covenants relating to the construct
ion of dams or canals, and contracts as to furnishing
water; covenants to pay rent; to insure; to repair, or to
deliver up in good condition; to reside on the premises;
or, to pay taxes •••

also, covenants creating easements

and servitudes generally.
Real covenants are, of course, sometimes
de s ignat ed by statute although where so designated such
covenants may not be strictly confined to those
specifically n amed , but other covenants by reason of their
character may be included within the meaning of such
statutes as also running viTi th t he land.
This is the case in California, as evidenced by the
following Code provision:
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"The only covenants which run ,.'l ith the land are
those specified in this title, and those which are
incidental thereto." 1
"gertain covenants, contained in grants of estates
in real property, are appurtenant to such estates, and
pass with them, so as to bind the assigns of the covenantor
an d to vest in the assigns of the covenantee, in the same
manner as if they had personally entered into them. Such
covenants are said to run with the land." 2
This necessarily intruduces us to the question - what,
then, does the Code provide mn "this title" as being
covenants running with the land?

The query is specifically

answered in the follo'wing provis ions:
"~very covenant contained in a grant of an estate
in real property, which is made for the direct benefit
of the property, or some part of it then in existence,
runs with the land. 1t 3

liThe last section includes covenants tf 6f warranty "
for quiet enjoyment" or for further assurance on the part
of the grantor, and covenants for the payment of rent,
or of taxes or assessments up on the land, on the part of
a grantee. It 4
"A covenant for the addition of some new thing to
real property, or for the direct benefit of some part
of the property not then in existence or annexed thereto,
when contained in a grant of an estate in such property,
and made by the covenantor expressly for his assigns
or to the assigns of the covenantee, runs with land so
far only as the assigns thus mentioned are concerned." 5
"A covenant running vvith the land binds those only
who acquire the whole estate of the covenantor in some
part of the property.1f 6
"A covenant made by the owner of land with the owner
of other land to do or refrain from doing some act on
his own land, which doing or refraining is expressed to be
for the benefit of the land of the covenantee, and which is
made by the covenantor expressly for his assigns or to the
assigns of the covenantee, runs with both of such parcels
1 Cal. Civil Code, 1461
2 Ibid 1460
~-------------------------------------

3
4

Cal. Civil Code 1462
Ibid 1463
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6

Ibid 1464
Ibid 1465
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of land. II 1
Referring back again to the weight of authority in
America, covenants in a lease relating to the thing demised
run with the land even though the covenant does not, in
certain instances, have reference to something to be done
on the land itself.

But if the thing to be done is

collateral to the land, and does not touch or concern
the thing demised, then the covenant is personal, and the
assignee is not charged though named in the covenant.
accordance with the

ge ne~al

In

rule, real covenants include

covenants to pay rent, to insure, to build houses on the
land demised, to pay for improvements, to make repairs,
or share in such expense, to renew a lease, etc.
"A covenant in a lease to the lessee, tlhis heirs and
assigns ", for a term of eight years, that if tt_e lessor
should sell or dispose of the demised premises the lessee
is to be entitled to a refusal of the sa.me, is a 'covenant
running with the land. 1I

.. . .

"Every covenant in the lease relating to the thing
demised, attaches to the land, and runs with it.tt 2
Following the rule that the intention is the

1
2

Ibid 1460.
Laffan v. Naglee, 9 Cal. 662.
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cardinal principle of interpretation of covenants, as
indication by the parties of t heir intention to bind sub
sequent holders of the property is necess ary to the
running of an agreement; otherwise it will be deemed per
sonal.

But a failure to state that the covenant is to

run with the land is immaterial where the intention of
the parties can be' gathered from the instrument.

The better

authority of the United states holds that a party-wall
agreement is in the nature of a covenant running with the
land.

And so an obligation to contribute to the cost of a

party-wall or to pay for the use of a party-wall is a
covenant running with the land, and the right to recover
t he sum agreed upon passes to the grantee of the original
builder under his de ed.
In general, however, the point to remember is Simply,
that the pl"'evailing American doctrine is to the effect
that any de ed transferring title, passes to the grantee
the benefit of a covenant that runs with the land.
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Part II
EQUITABLE

SERVITUDES

The COlIL'TIOn La1:v recognized eas ements, profits
a prendre, and covenants running with the land.
equity has added a fourth category.

To these

In the classical

sense, the equitable servitude was created by a covenant,
but the decisive point was· the declared intention of the
parties, not the form in which it was declared.
At law, profits and easements can be created only
by dee d or by adverse user, and in ord er t hat a covenan t
run with the land it must be a formal covenant.

Equity,

on the other hand, here as elsewhere, look s to the substance
rather than to the form, and the substance is declared
intention.
To use the language of Bigelow, C.J., in Whitney v.
Uni on Ry. Co., . equitable easements would fall properly
within this definition:

itA ri ght, without profit, which

the owner of land has acquire d , by contract, or estoppel,
to restrict or regulate, for the benefit of his own
property, the use and enjoyment of the land of another. " 1

1

Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. 77 Ma s s. 359.
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The pur p ose of inserting restrictions in deeds is
manifestly to prevent such a use of the premises by the
grantee and those claiming und e r him, as might diminish
t h e value of the residue of the land belonging to the
grantor , or impair its eligibility as sites for private
resid e nces.

That such purpose is a le g itimate one, and may

be carried out, consistently with the rules of law, by
reasonable and prop e r covenants, conditi o ns or restrictions,
cann ot be doubt e d.
Every owner of real property has the ri g ht to deal
with it, as to restrain its use by his grantees within such
limits as to prevent its a ppropriation to purp oses which
will i mp a ir t h e value or diminish the pleasure of the
enjoyment of the land 1Jvhlch h e retains.

The only restriction

in this ri ght is, with a due re g ard to public policy, and
vITi thout creating an unlawful restraint on trade.

The question is, to what extent and in what cases are
such stipulations binding on those who take the estate
under the grantee, directly, or by a derivative title?
Upon this point the better opinion would seem to be that
such agre ements are valid, and capably of being enforced
in equity against all those who tak e the estate with
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notice of them, although they may not be strictly speaking,
real 60venants, so as to run with the land, or of a nature
to create a technical qualificatlon of the title conveyed
by the deed.

Thls opinlon rests on the princlple that, as

in equity that which is agreed to be done shall be consider
ed as performed, a purchaser of land, with notlce of a
right or interest in it, subsisting in another, is liable
to the same extent and in the same manner as the person
from whom he made the purchase, and is bound to do that which
his vendor agreed to perform.

Therefore, an agreement or

covenant, though merely personal in its nature, and not
purporting to bind assignees, will nevertheless be enforced
against them, unless they have a higher and better right in
equity as bona fide purchasers without notice.

It is on

this ground, that a purcbaser of an estate, taking it with
notice of a prior agreement by the vendor to sell it to
another, can be compelled in equity to convey it according
to such agreement o
In like manner, by taking an estate from a grantor
with notice of valid agreements made by him with the
former owner of the property, concerning the mode of
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occupation and use of the estate granted, the purchaser
is bound in equity to fulfill such agreements 'wi th the
original owner, because it would be unconscientious and
inequitable for him to set aside and disregard the legal and
valid acts and agreements of his vendor in regard to the
:estate, of which he had notice when he became its purchaser.
In this vievVl, the precise form or nature of the covenant or
agreement is quite immaterial.
should run with· the land.

It is not essential that it

A personal covenant or agreement

will be held valid and binding in equity on a purchaser
taking the estate with notice.

It is not binding on him merely

because he stands as an assignee of the party who made the
agreement, but because he has taken the estate with notice
of a valid agr e ement concerning it, which he cannot equitably
refuse to perform.
The growth of cities and the more crowded conditions
of modern life, the desire of home owners to secure desirable
home surroundings has led to a demand for land limited
entirely to development for residence purp oses.

This natural

desire of house-hold ers has quite natural ly been exploited
by realtors and land companies so that the restricted residential
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property is now becoming the
in or near our cities.

~ule

rather than the exception

The legal machinery to achieve this

end has been found in the main not in the ancient rules of
easements or covenants but in the activities of the court of
equity in preventing fraud and unfair dealing.

The basis of

the modern rule rests upon the equitable doctrine of notice,
that he who takes land with the notice of a rest r iction upon
it will not in equity and g ood conscience be permitted to
act in violat io n of t h e terms of these re~trictions. 1
The re are t wo theories as to the running of equitable
restrictions.

One is that these restrictio n s are enforced

as contracts concerni ng land, the second is that they are
enforced substantially as servitudes or easements on land.
With reference to the first theory - the contract
which embodies the restriction is specifically enforced
against both the promisee and those who take from him with
notice.

Those who may enforce the obligation include not

only the promisee but those who take from him and also those
in the neighborhood who may be considered beneficiaries of
the contract.

It also follo ws that there may be an action

for damages for breach of the contract possibly in situations
where specific performance is not p ossible.

1

38 Yale Law Journal 152.
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"It is a well

~ ettled

rule that 'where land has been

developed according to a neighborhood plan of restriction
anyone purchasing in reliance of such restriction may sue
anyone else in the neighborhood taking with notice, no
matter when each purchased.

So, a perior taker may sue a

later taker and vice versa, and on division of land one may
sue another though each claim through the same original grantee."
The first theory while supported by able

juri~ts

1

and

text writers, presents many difficulties, both theoretical
and practical - and these difficulties are of a serious
nature.

The contract theory is, as we know, not sufficient

to justify the running of real covenants.

The concepts of

an agreement touching and concerning land, and of privity of
estate were employed to justify such transfer.

But with these

equitable interests while they concern the land and run with
it, still the requirements of real covenants are seemingly
repudiated.

The practical results of the contract theory

may be a failure to benefit the persons whose interest should
be protected, and a possibility of giving a right where
none should exist.
The other View, supported by Dean Pound and other
earned writers, is that these restrictions be considered as

1

Tiffany 1436, 1437, Also, 21

A.L.R~

1281, 1306, 1324.
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servitudes upon the land similar at least to easements
and profits.

This view will be discussed more fully, and

illustrated with decisions, in subsequent pages.
In addition to these two aforementioned views, the
doctrine of equitable restrictions rests also on two other
grounds, which have been in the past strongly suggested as
a basis for the enforcement of these restrictions; and,
which, at the present day, exert no little force in the
reasoning of the many leading text writers and juris ts vvho
are occupied with pleading the cause of equitable servitudes,
. or r4strictions.

The first proposition is based on the

argument that if the subsequent grantee were allowed to take
the subject of the grant without the

r~strictions

it would

permit an unjust enrichment on the part of such grantee, made
possible by his being free of the restrictions, which the
grantor had a right to enforce.

It would be the case of one

receiving something on the basis of fulfilling requirements,
and having received, refusing to follow the agreement out of
which he has realized benefits.
In the case of Tulk v. Moxhay decided in 1848, which was
the leading case on this restriction subject, the subject of
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unjust enricbment was made the basis of the d e cision.

In that

case plaintiff was the owner of vacant lot and several houses
in Leicester Square.

He sold vacant piece to one Elms.

Covenanted in deed that Elms, his heirs, and assigns would
erect no building thereon.

The property passed by several

mesne conveyances to defendant whose deed did not contain
the aforesaid covenant, but he had notice of said covenant.
Defendant planned to erect a building on the lot, and plaintiff
sought an injunction against it.

An injunction was granted

on the ground that if such a right vvere not recognized and
enforced there would be an unjust
expense.

enricp~ent

at plaintiff's

In the words of the court - " •• the question is

not ·whether the covenant runs with the land, but whether a
party shall be permitted to use the land in a manner incon
sistent with the contract entered into by his grantor, and
with notice of wh ich he purchased.
would be affected by the

covenan~2

Of course, the price
and nothing could be more

inequitable than that the original purchaser should be able
to sell the property the next day for a greater price, in
consideration of the assignee being allowed to escape from
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the liability which he himself had undertaken. I!

l


At the present day courts usually pay no attention to
the .question of unjuBt enrichment in restrictive agreement
cases.

The case of Rogers v. Hosegood (1900) is illustrative

of this, for it was held there:

that a transferee of the

covenantor was entitled to enforce an equitable servitude
though the plaintiff knew nothing of the restriction when he
bought the property from the covenantee.

2

The real question involved in these early decisions was
whether or not e quitable servitudes could be enforced against
the transfere e s of the original covenantor as well as against
him where the former took with notice but did not covenant.
It vvas in these early cases decided that they were enforceable
and decisions since have substantially followed them.
The other view to which I have reference is the one
concerning specific performance.

It is the basis upon which

recovery is usually predicated·in these restriction cases.
And, although not considered a separate and distinct view,
it is nevertheless, gravitated to as a basis for the enforcibility
of equitable servitudes.

However, whether it be considered

a distinct line of opinion or not, the fact is that in every
cas.e where it is possible and the right to enforce restrictions
is made clear, as a remedy, it will be eTIployed and the

1
2

Tulk v. Moxhay 2 Phillips 774.
Rogers v. Hosegood, 2 Ch. 388.
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restrictive provisions enforced as agreed; rather than pursue
a remedy at law, w"bich is oftentimes inadequate or not
existent at all.
The difficulty that the legal pioneers in this
particular field of the law met was the fact that at common
law they had no redress.

It was the ri g id rule of the common

law that covenants running with the land bound only those who
succeeded to the estate of the covenantor and could be created
only where there was privity of estate.

Furth er, coven ants

running with the land g en erally occurred in leases.

The

reason for t h e early d ecisions vms t hat the common law was
inadequate on t h is poin t •.• equity came to the relief of those
thus injured under its own particular banner - tf equity will
not suffer a vvrong to be without a remedy. If
Referring back to bhe validity of these restrictive
agreements it may be said that their validity has also been
recognized and established and t h eir, performance enforced
in equity, as against subsequent purchasers with notice,
upon the ground that

SUCll

stipulations create an easement or

privile ge in the land conveyed, for the use and benefit of
the grantor, and those who might afterwards claim under him as
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owners of adjacent land, of wh ich the land granted originally
formed a part.

In such cases, although the covenant or agree

ment in the deed, regarded as a contract merely, is binding
only on the original parties, yet, in irder to carry out the
plain intent of the parties it will be construed as creating
a ri ght or interest, in the nature of an incorporeal
hereditament or easement, appurtenant to the remaining land
belonging to the grantor, s.t the time of the grant, and arising
out of and attached to the land, part of the original parcel,
conveyed to the grantee.
When, therefore, it appears by a fair interpretation
of the wOl"ds of a grant that it was the intent of the
parties to create or reserve a right, in the nature of a
servitude or easement in the property granted for the benefit
of other land owned by the grantor and originally forming
with the land conveyed, one parcel, such right will be
deemed appurtenant to the land of the grantor and binding on
that conveyed to the grantee and the right and burden thus
created will respectively pass to and be binding on all
subsequent grantees Of . the respective lost of land.
A court of equity will give full effect to the
stipulation, on the complaint of a party for whose benefit
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as owner of the land, the stipulation was intended.
This discussion invariably leads us to one of the
most interesting and decisive cases on this subject.

The

case of Parker v. Nitingale is unique in the force which it
exerts in establishing the lavv on restrictive agreements or
equ itable servitudes in this country.

The estates in question

were situated on a tlcourtrt or ltplace Tl in Boston, and con
sisted of several dwelling-houses erected on each side of a
"blind streetT!, or a street open only at one end.
on which these had

b~en

The land

erected originally b e longed to

several heirs, who agreed between themselves that it s h ould
be laid out into a court, to be exclusively occupied by
dwelling-houses, and that in conveying the lots the grantees
should be laid under obligation by way of condition or
limi tation of the use thereof, "that no other building
exce p t one of brick or stone of not less than

th~ee

stories

in height, and for a dwelling-house only " , should be
erected by them,

The deeds of the lots were accordingly

respectively made u p on this condition and the sfulle vIas
refe r red to or repeated in the subsequent conveyances.
One of the tenants of one of the houses er4cted under this
arrangement was about to open a restaurant in the house
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which he occupied, and the owners of the other houses
in the court prayed an injunction to restrain him from so
doing.
The original ,grantors had ceased to have any interest
in the court, and it vdll be perceived that whatever there
was of covenant or condition in the original deeds, was
between the grantors and grantees severally, and not
between the several grantees, and t hat, consequently there
was an entire want of privit7 between them, and the question
was, if the several owners, holding by independent titles,
could enforce against anyone of them the negative easement
of not using the premises except as a dwelling-house.
Bigelow, C.J., in giving the opinion of the court,
sustaining and enforcing this easement and enjoining the
defendant from using his house as a restaurant, proce eds
with great clarity into the grounds u pon which the decision
rests.

It is essential that we consider at length some

of the points involved in this opinion, as they play such
an important part in the development of this subject.
"A court of chancery 'w ill recognize and enforce
agreements concerning the occupation and mode of use of real
estate, a lthough they are not ex'oressed with technical
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accuracy, as exce p tions or reservations out of a grant not
binding a s covenants real running 'wi th t he land. Nor
is it at all material t h at such stipulations should not
be binding at law, or that any privity of , estate should
subsist between parties in order to render t h em obligatory,
and to warrant equitable relief in case of their infraction."
riA covenant, though in gross at law, may nevertheless
be binding in equity, even to the extent of fastening a
servi tude

01'"

easement on real property, or of securing to

the owner of one parcel of land a privilege, or, as it is
sometimes called, "a ri ght to an amenity " in the use of an
adjoining parcel, by which his own estate may be enhanced
in value or rendered more agre eable as a place of residence. 1f 1
"Restrictions and li::n.itations which may be pu t on
property by means of suc h stipulations derive t heir
validi ty from the righ t which every ovmer of the fee has to
dis pose of his estate eit her absolutely or by a qualified
grant, or to regulat e t h e manner in which it s hall be used
and occupied. " 2
"So long as he (the orig inal purchaser) retains the
title in himself, his covenants and a gr e ements r eflecting

1 Parker v. Nitingale 6 Allan (Mass) 341.
2 6 Allen 343.
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the use a.nd enjoyment of his estat e wil l be binding on
him personally, and can be specifically enforced i n equity."
"'iihen he disposes of it by grant or o therwIse, t hose
wbo t ake under him cannot equitably refuse to ful f ill
stipul at i ons concer ning the pr emises of which he h ad
notice.

It is upon this ground that c our ts of equity will

afford relief to part ies aggrie v ed by t he negle ct or
omi ssion to c omply wi t h agreements resp ec ting real estat e
afte r it has passed by mesne conveyances out of the hands
of t h os e who "'w ere parties t o t he or i gi nal c ontra c t .

1
II

!fA purcr..aser of land, with n otiee of a r i ght or
i nt er est in it existing onl y by agr eement with his vendor,
is bound t o do t hat which his grant or h ad agr e ed to perform
because it would be unconscienti ous and inequit able for
him to disre g ard or violate the valid agr e ements of the
ven d or in r egard to the estate of which h e h ad notice
when he became the purchas er.

In such cases it is true

t h at the aggrieved party can often have no r emedy at law.
There may be ne ither privity of es t ate nor privity of

1

6

Allen 343
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contract between himself and those who attempt to appropriate
property in contraventJ.on of the use or mode of enjoyment
impressed upon it by the agreement of their grantor, and
with notice of wh ich they took the estate from him.

But it

is none the less contrary to equity that those to whom the
estate comes, with notice of the rights of another respecting
it, whould willfully disregard them, and in the absence of any
remedy at law the stronger is the necessity of affording in
such cases equitable relief, if it can be given consistently
with public policy and without violating any absolute rule
of law."
Chief Justice Bigelo'w notes the following cOlJl..Yr1.ent
with interest and stresses it in the conclusion of his well
written opinion:
"It may be well to add that while a court of equity
will carry into effect agreements or restri cti ons sifuilar
to those set f·orth in the bill, in cases where there - is
nothing shown to render their enforcement inequitable,
circlLmstances may exist which mi8ht warrant a refusal to
grant equitable relief when where it was made to appear that
there had been a failure to use and occupy premises in
accordance with the terms of tbB deed by which they were con
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veyed.

If, for inst anc e, it was shown th8.t one or t wo owners

of estates insisting on the observance of restrictions contrary
to the interes t and wishes of a large number of ovmers having
similar rights and interests, by which great pecuniary loss
would be inflicted upon them, or a great -public improvement
be prevented, a court of equity might Vle ll hesitate to use its
powers to enforce a specific perfornance or r estrain a breach
of the restriction." 1
In this last notation we find that equity is in full
force in this matter of equitable restrictions.

It is not

mere interference but actual jurisdiction with a l l its wide
spread powers, enforcing the restrictions in accordance with
agreements and intentions, but refusing to enforce them where
to carry out the intent would manifestly injurious to the
interests of many and beneficial

merely to a few.

Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. presents the subject with
much authoritative background and is, incidentally, the
basis of the law in our state, California, on this matter.
Time and again, California courts have cited this case and
upheld it with a great amount of favorable comment.
The facts in t:bis case were: Plaintiff, haVing had her

1

Vtlb.itney v. Union Ry. Co. 77 I'JIass 359.
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land surveyed, graded ancl roads constructed, sold the same
to one White.

In the deed (duly recorded) the following

res tr'ictions li'iTere inserted:
"That if said Artemas White, his heirs or assigns,
shall suffer any building to stand or be erected witbin ten
feet of Lambert Avenue, or shall use or follow, or suffer· any
person to use or follow, upon ahy part thereof, the business
of a taverner, or any

mec~anical

or manufacturing, or any

naseous or offensive business Whatever, then the said
grantors, or . any person or persons hereafter, who at the
time then being shall be a

propr~etor

of a ny lot of land •••

north of Lamber t Avenue, shall have the right, after sixty
days notice thereof, to enter upon the premises with his,
he r or their servants, and forcibly, if necessary, :bo remove
the refrom any building or buildings erected or used contrary
to the abo'le restrictions and to abate all nulsances,
without being liable to any damages therefor, except such
as may be wantonly and unnecessarily done."
Defendants acquired property t hrough mesne conveyances
and added on the lot in question a stable, and began laying
down rails and were proceeding to construct a turntable at
Lambert Avenue .
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The court held: "These restrictions, after the deed had
been recorded, might be enforced in equity against an assignee
of the grantee of the original grantoI'."

1

irA restriction of the manner of using land granted, not
against public policy, and beneficial to adjacent land of
the grantor, whether inserted by way of condition or covenant,
or otherwise, may be enforced in equitY',: against the grantee
or his assigns with notice." 2
Another interesting case which is handed down to us from
the courts of Massachusetts, is Hubbell v. ·Warren.

It was

alleged in the bill which was to restrain defendant from
building within less than twelve feet of the line of the
street, that, when plair:tiff took his deed, the defendant
orally agreed that the houses should not be built "TviJithin that
distance fbom the street and that he, the plaintiff, had
erected his house accordingly.
It was held that Han agreement between the owners of
adjacent parcels of land, restricting the mode of its use
and enjoyment, although not entered into in the form of a
cove n ant or condition, or so framed as to be binding upon
heirs or assigns by virtue of privity of estate, may never
theless create a right in the nature of a servitude or ease

1
2

Whitney v. Union Ry. Co. 77 Mass. 359.
77 Mass 363.
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ment in the land to which it rela-':: es which can be enforced
in equity.

But to establish such servitude or easement

it must appear, either by express stipulation 91" necessary
or unavoidable implication, that the parties intended to impose
a permanent restraint on the use or mode of occupation of
1
their respective estates."
This might be done by a condition or rese r vation incor
porated into a grant, or ap p e nded to it as a covenant
real, or so inserted as to carry notice to all persons
that the use of the premises is, to a certain extent,
qualified or limited, and the intent to create a servitude
or privilege, in its nature perpetual, manifested. But
Yvhere it rests in parol, or i n form of a covenant in gross,
or by a separate inde pendent
stip~lation

agree ~ne n t,

it . must contain a

in express terms that the ri ght or privilege is to

be permanent restriction on the land, or such as leads to the
conclus i on that that is the intention of the parties.
There is a serious conflict as to whether the servitude
should be considered as an interest in land so that a writing
is necessary for its c r eation.

Mr. Herbert Tiffany inclines

to the view that such interests being purely equitable {and

1

Hubbell v. 1;'l a r ren, 8 Allen ( Mass.) 173.
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1

to this extent personal) need not be in writing.

Yet,

since they do affect rather substantially the land, there
seems to be no valid reason why they are not within the policy
2
of the statute.
A restriction may be implied from acts of the parties,
such as reference to plans showing a scheme of restrictions,
or representations of tbe owner.

But the evidence of an

intention to create a restriction must be very clear and mere
reference to a building scheme will not compel the owner by
its provisions witbout change.
The contract or covenant creates an equitable interest
in land and is within the statute of Frauds.

If it is not in

writing it will not be enforced unless there has been part
performance, or expenditure of money on the faith of it,
sufficient to create an estoppel.

There is, however, a

distinction between a restriction and an ordinary trust in
regard to the statute of Frauds.

In case of a trust the name

of the cestui must be in the written instrument.

This is

because the gist of the trust is the payment of the trust fund
to the cestui and the trust is wholly uncertain unless his
name appears.

The gist of a restriction is the doing or not

1 2 Tiffany 1432
24 Michigan Law Review 854.
2. Phillips v. West Rockaway Land Co. 226 N.Y. 507.
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doing of certain acts to certain land.

If the acts and the

land are stated in writing, the court considers the statute
satisfied, and will gather the other terms of the restriction
by reading the writing as a whole in the light of surrounding
circumstances.

For this reason it is unnecessary that the

wri ting should state to whom the benefit of the restriction
shall accrue, whe ther to the covenantor personally or in
favor of some other parcel of land.

This is a question of

fact to be determined by the intention of the vendor, and
that question nrust be determined upon the same rules of
evidence as any other question of intention.

The ownership

and character of buildings in the neighborhood, plans,
building schemes, the existence of similar restriction on
other lots, even parol agreements among neighbors, may be
shown as bearing upon tbe probable intention of the contract
ing paJ;'ties.
The conclusions that these r4strictions should be

tr~ated

in substance as an easement indicates the form of language
in which they should most properly be couched.

There has,

however, been a tendency to employ the language of contract
or of condition.

This is quite unfortunate in that both

terms emphasize the personal nature of the interest which is
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probably contrary to the pur pose of restriction.

It may

lead to the conclusion that only the grantee is bound in
damages and that the land itself is unrestricted.

As a

condi tion, a right of re-.entry will be left in the grantor
and this will operate as a clou,d on the title.

All these

difficulties are avoided if the restriction is stated merely
as a sel'vitude binding upon the granted land in favor of all
other land of a certain described area.
It is generally sufficient that the language used in the
expression of a restriction on land, should be a clear,
definite and understandable indication that the restriction
is on the land, and not merely a personal covenant binding on
the original grantee, to die when the land is removed from the
ownership of this original grantee.
When the restriction does become part of the land
therefore, and binding on subsequent grantees, it is no
objection that there was no privity of title or estate between
the original grantor and subsequent grf\.ntees.

I repeat this

because of its importfu'1.ce as a bas is of obj Bction against
the upholding of equitable restrictions and servitudes on
land.

Since this requirement of privity of estate, so

important in the law of real covenants, does not apply here,
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several learned writers have spoken in this connection, (I
would say, quite to the pOint), of the "equitable principle
of privity of conscience."
tiThe action of courts of equity in such cases is not
limited by rules of legal liability and does not depend on
legal privity of estate, or require .that the party invoking
the aid of the court should come in under and after the
covenant

$

A covenant or agreement restricting the use of any

lands or tenements in favor of or on account· of other lands,
creates an easement and makes one tenement, in the language
of the civil law, servient, and the other dominant,

and

this without regar d to any privity or connection of title or
estate in the two parce]:s or their owners.

All that is

necessary is a clear manif estation of the intention of the
person who is the source of the title to subject one parcel
of land to a restriction in its use, for the benefit of
another, whether that other belong at the time to himself
or to a third person, and sufficient

lan~age

to make that

restriction perpetual." 1
This leads us now up to the point - who are bound by
equitable servitudes?

It is nOD that this question has been

neglected to be answered previously in this work, because

1

Gilbert v. Peteler

38 Barber 488, 514.
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it has; but the discussion is directed more to the
necessi:by of notice and the part played by registry statutes
in this respect.
The benefit of equitable servitudes like other equitable
rights may not be enforced against a bona fide purchaser.
However, under registry statutes if the right is recorded
it is enforceable

agai~st

bona fide purchasers.

In this

particular, equitable servitudes differ from common 18.w
easements or profits which were enforceable against any
successor in title though he paid value in good faith.

In

this regard equitable servitudes differ f:rom covenants running
with the land which were enforceable only against those who
succeeded to the estate of the covenantot, whereas there is
no such limitation upon the enforcement of an equitable
servitude.
To illustrate this last point, in the case of Abergarw
BreweY'Y Co. v. Holmes, the covenant in the mortgage was not
to buy any wines, beers, etc., from anyone except the
mortgagee; the restriction was enforced against an under
lessee with notice, on the ground that it was the intention
of the parties to bind everyone claiming under the mortgagor.

1

Abergarw BreweI'Y Co. v. Holmes 1 Ch. 188
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1

It has been generally held that the registry statutes
allow and therefore require the recording of equi:t able
servitudes; and, where they are so recorded, they
enforceable regardless of actual notice.

ar~

This constitutes

strong evidence of the force that registry statutes play in
this matter of notice; for, ordinarily, in the absence of
notice, a bona fide purcbaser is not bound by tbe restrictions
on the land which he buys.

Manifestly, it would be grossly

inequitable to hold one accountable for restrictions of which
he had no knowledge at the time he entered into the contract
of purchase with the vendor.
Though one who claims title from a trustee by adverse
possession is entitled to hold it against the cestui que trust
even if be knew of the trust, yet, an adverse user who secures
title to property subject to an equitable servitude does not
thereby destroy the servitude even though he had no notice
of it.

To sever the servitude it would be necessary for him

to secure a release or to violate it and have it ou.tlawed by
l
the running of the statute of Limitations.
It is generally said that restrictions, as the name
implies, are limited to agreements of a negative character.

1

In re: Nisbet and Pott's Contract 1 Ch. 386.
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This is· not strictly true.

The English cases hold directly

that only negative restricticins wfull be enforced in equity
and that affirmative acts will not be enforced against takers
with notice.

In the American cases there appears to be some

yonflict with at least considerable tend ency to follow the
English rule.

However, textwriters, such as Pomeroy, Clark

and Tiffany favor enforcing both kinds of easements.
Equity will always take jurisdiction over negative con
tracts, for the remedy is simple - an injunction restraining
the forbidd en act, or a mandatory injunction to undo what has
been done in breach of the agree ment.

Practically all

restrictions belong to this class. Equity will not decree
specific performance of affirmative contracts that call for
the exercise of skill, discretion or good faith; but when
the required acts are of a simple nature it seems that the
court will take jurisdiction.
The case of Zinn v. Sidler presents a point of
interest in the follo wing words:

"Restrictive covenants

lessen the fee and are not favored in law.

They should

therefore be made manifest in no uncertain manner and not be
1
left entirely to implication."
In Tallmadge v. The East River Bank, a New York case,

1

Zinn v. Sidler 187

~V .

1172.
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the facts were:

It was an action to restrain defendant who

owned a corner on 8th street and Third Avenue, New York
City, from erecting a building thereon covering the whole
lot, and to require them to leave a space of eight feet
between the bullding and the line of the street in conformity
to the plan adopted by the original owner of the tpact who
in selling the other lots exhibited the plans showing the
eight foot set-back and stating that it was his plan to so
build on all of the tract.

The lower court found that

defendants bought with notice of this restriction inasmuch
as they were told that they would not be able to build
eight feet of the lot designated in a mesne conveyance as
a courtyard.

But the deeds of the vendor to these defendants

were absolute and unrestricted.
It was held that lithe owner of land may, by parol
contract with the -ourchaseps of successive parcels in
respect to the manner of its improvements and occupation
affect the remaining parcels with an equity requiring them
also to be occupied in conformity to the general plan,
which is binding upon a subsequent purchaser with notice of
the fact, though his legal title be absolute and unrestricted. "I

1

Tallmadge v. East River Bank

26 N.Y. 105.

-64

An owner of land may restrict land for his own
personal advantage; or he may secure it for himself as Dwner
of the land, in which case it descends to each owner of the
land.

Again, he may seek to benefit a grantee to whom he

has already conveyed land..

But the most freque!1t case ia.

when he sells land, laid out in lots, subject to a_general
restriction.

Most of the decisions rendered on the subject

of equitable easements are concerned particularly with circma
stances surrounding subdivisions and the restrictions attached
to building on lots sold with the one main tract.
courts have presented some very interesting and

California

l~ading

cases

in this respect; we will discuss them shortly.
The rest to which the benefit and buden of restrictive
agreements attach, is commonly land.
property.

But it may be personal

In the familiar case of the sale of a business

with an agreement by the seller not to engage in the same
business within a certain distance, the benefit of the
agreement passes to a subsequent assignee of the businesse
In Murphy' v. GhristianPress Association Publishing Co.,
the facts showed that a corporation owning the copyright
of a prayer book sold a set of plates and authorized the
vendees, subject to certain restrictions, to publish the
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work from that set of plates, covenanting that it would not
sell a set of plates to any other publisher without the
consent of the vendees - the agreement contained a provision
that the retail price for plainly bound copies should be $1.25
and fixed the discounts to be allowed to the trade.

Subsequent

ly a receiver of the corporation sold t h e remaining sets
of plates and the co pyright of the prayer book to a company
having full notice of such agreement and the latter proceeded
to pubiliish fro m t h e plates a finer book at a price less than
that fixed in the agreement between the vendor and the first
vendees.
Held:

liThe agreement by the v endor, though technically

a personal on e, i mposed an obli g ation upon all who acquired
the plates with notice of such agreement and t he first
vendees were entitled to an injunction restraining the
second vendee from selling its publications at less than
the stipulated price."
The weight of authority supporting the American
doctrine of equitable easements, as based on the decisions
of Massachusetts' courts, is mirrored in California
i D the case of Werner v. Graham.

This decis i on consti t utes
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the leading case in this state on land restrictions; and,
it is to this that we now turn our consideration.
One Mar shall, the owner of the whole tract, in 1902
subdivided it into blocks and lots, and recorded a map of
the subdivision.

After the recordation of the map, he

began selling and conveying the lots.

In all of the deeds

from Marshall ap p ear restrictive provisions which, while
differing slightly in some instances, depend ent upon the
location of the particular lot, as, for instance, upon its
facing east or west, are yet so uniform and consistent in
character as to indicate umr1istakably that Marshall had in
mind a general and common plan which he was follovdng.

The

restrictions in the deed by Marshall conveying the plaintiff's
lot are typical and read:-

"Provided, however, that this

conveyance is made upon and shall be subject to tIle following
express conditions, to-wit: That no building to be used
as a saloon, or tenement houses known as flats, or livery
stable, or store of any kind or nature whatever shall be
erected or placed on said premises or any part thereof, nor

-67

shall any such business be conducted on said premises or any .
part thereof at any time within 30 years from the date
hereof; that no derrick for boring any oil well shall be
er4cted or placed, nor shall oil be produced in any manner
whatsoever, on said premises or any part thereof at any time
within 50 years from the date hereof; and also that any
buildings to be used as dwelling-houses which may be erected
or placed upon said premises or any part thereof at any time
within 25 years from the date hereof, shall be located and
placed as follows: ••• and the reasonable cost thereof shall
not be less than $3000; and said dwelling and its appurtenances
shall not be located less than 40 feet from the front property
line of the premises; and not more than one house and its
appurtenances shall be built or placed on each lot herein
conveyed.

If the said party of the second part, his heirs

or assigns or successors in estate, shall in any way fail
to keep or perform the conditions above specified, or any
one of them in any respect whatsoever, then any and all right,
title, interest and estate hereby granted or conveyed shall
revert to and become vested in the said parties of the first
part, their heirs or assigns."

"That said party of the second
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part accepts this deed and conveyance upon and subject to
each and all of the said conditions herein set forth.

It

is further understood and agreed that each and all of said
conditions and covenants shall run with said premises and
shall be binding upon the heirs, assigns and all successors
in estate of the said party of the second part."

1

This action is to quiet title to real property, the
purpose being to obtain a judicial determination that the
land of the plaintiff is free of these restrictions as to
its use.
Neither the plaintiff nor any of the defendants were
original parties to the covenants - there exists no privity
of contract between them.

The plaintiff does not hold under

or through any of the defendants, nor any of them under or
through him.

It follows that the covenants are not covenants

recognized by the common law as running with the land,
such as covenants between lessor and lessee, or between
grantor and grantee for the benefit of the estate conveyed.
Furthermore, the covenants here involved are manifestly not
for the benefit of the estate conveyed, but to its
detriment.
If then these covenants are to be given force, as

1

Y{erner v. Graham 181 Cal. 174, 177, 178
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between the plaintiff 8.nd defendants, it clearly must be
because:

(a) The burden imposed by them was one upon the

land conveyed and incident to its ownership, so that the
plaintiff when he acquired his lot, acquired it subject
to such burden; and (b) the benefit of the covenants
was an incident of the ownership of the other lots in the
tract, so that when Marshall parted with them the benefit
of the covenants passed with them as an incident of their
ownership and the defendants are now entitled to such
benefit as the present owners of the lots

In other words,

in order that the covenants have force, not merely as between
the original parties, but as

~et ween

the plaintiff and the

defendants, it nnlst appear that their insertion in the deed
by Marshall, was in effect the c eation of what amounts to a
servitude, to the burden of which the plaintiff's lot was
subjected as the servient

tenemell~,

o.no to the benefit of

which the remainder of the tract was entitled as the
dominant tenement.
"The enforceuien"t of cov8I",ants restricting the use of
one parcel of land for th e benefit of another parcel,
not merely as between the original parties, but as between
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the original parties, but as between their respective grantees
betvleen whom privity of estate or of contract can p:coperly be
said to exist., originated at a compar8.t.ively recent date in

•

the chancery courts and appa.rently without a clear
appreciation of the fact that the enforcement of such
covenants for and against grantees of tbe original parties
was, in effect, the creating of seI>vituo.e.

Such s 8rvit'url s;;"

2.re frequently spoken of as "equitable easements".

They

were unknown to the c OTomon law and are no t among the
servitudes enumerated by our code.

(Civil Code 801,802. ) " 1

"They are opposed to the rule that the owner of land
may not create new and heretofore unknown estates, and while
their validity, that is, the enforceable character of such
covenants as against grantees of the original parties 
is now too well established to admit of question, it has
resulted that the covenants which will be enforced are
limited to those which

dil~ectly

concern and benefit what we

may term the dominant tenement, and also, that any pro v isions
of an instrument creating or claimed to create such a
servitude will be strictly construed, any doubt being
resolved in favor of the free use of t he land."

.~

1
2•

181 Cal. 180.
181 Cal. 181.
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"A servitude running with the land in favor of one
parcel and against another is not created where the owner
of the tract sells a portion of it, exacting of the
grantee restrictive provisions as to its use, but without
a word indicating that the land conveyed is a part of a
larger tract, the balance of which the grantor still
retains, or that the restrictions are intended for the
benefit of other lands, o"r that there benefit is to inure
to or pass with other lands, and without any description or
designation of the land which is to be the dominant
tenement."

Hence, there was no easement here.

IIWhen the owner of a subdivided tract conveys that
various parcels in the tract by deeds containing appropriate
language imposing restl' ictions on each parcel as part of a
general plan of restricti.ons common to all the parcels and
designed for their mutual benefit, mutual equitable servitudes
are thereby created in favor of each parcel as against all
others, for the agreement between the grantor and each
grantee in such case as expressed in the instruments
between them is both the parcel conveyed shall be subject
to restrictions in accordance with the plan for the benefit
of all the other parcels and also that all other parcels shall

be subject to such restrictions for its benefit."
"It is not the grantor's intent

1

alone that governs, but

the joint intent of himself and his grantees, and such
intent must be expressed in the instruments which constitute
the final memorials of their understanding."

2

other cases to the same effect are Firth v. Marovich,
160 Cal. 257; Los Angeles Co. v. Muir, 136 Cal. 36; Long v.
Crmner Co., 155 Cal. 402.
The Werner v. Grahrua case is important and is
indeed an esseDtial decision i n the establishment of tIle
equitable easement theory in California.

The whole

discussion in that case may, hoYvever, be surmned up in the
simple statement that

~

the parties desire to create mutual

rights in real property of the character claimed in this
case, they must say so, and must say it in the only place
where it can be given legal effect, namely, in the written
i nstruments exchanged between them which constitute the
final expression of their und erstanding.

It is the

existence of the mutual intent to restrict for the benefit
of other parcels - and this ' must be shown clearly.

It was

the absence of this qualification that defeated the
restrictive covenants in the Grahrua case.

1
2

181 Cal. 184.
181 Cal. 184, 185.
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It has been said previously in this work, that
there has been no explosive change in the law of easements,
either legal or equitable, as it passed through different
periods of legal history.

The few changes suffer e d, have

been gradual and comparatively proportionate.
this respect is still in its infancy.

The law in

It is, however,

the regret of the author, that owing to the nature of this
work, he cannot speculate on the future of this subject.
But, as the demand for highly restricted residential districts
grows (as 'it is now doing with incres.sing force), so shall
this phase of the law have to grow.

And it will be in this

growth that the greatest changes in the law of easements
will take place.

These will be quick changes; still

proportionate, but answering the crying need of the populace
for freedom from the unquiet!
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